the leading edge of rapid aging--4/21/2026

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Today's selection--from Asia's Aging Security by Andrew Oros. Northeast Asia’s rapidly aging democracies:

“Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan face the most dramatic aging and shrinking populations in the Indo-Pacific in the 2020s, yet, to date, none have moved in the direction of reducing their military capabilities or readiness due to their rapid aging.

“The locus of rapid aging, population shrinkage, and security concerns in the world is Northeast Asia. In this region, three rapidly aging democracies and security partners of the United States face three rapidly aging autocracies that regularly signal nefarious intentions through their military activities and bellicose statements, including through rising gray-zone actions and provocative use of their potent military forces–and, in the case of Russia, outright invasion of one of its European neighbors, Ukraine.

"On the surface, there is a rough parallel of demographic direction among these security partners and rivals, but the later aging of China, North Korea...and Russia is one important difference–perhaps explaining differences in behavior in the past decade as aging has intensified but not yet reached super-aged status for the aging autocracies. Moreover, when examined in the greater depth presented in this and the following chapter, beyond differences in the timing of each demographic transition, levels of economic development, total population size, and ability to shape the actions of populations through government control result in significant variation across these six core cases in how rapid aging affects military readiness and broader security strategies of these aging powers. This variation underscores both a central argument of this book–that population demographics are indeed a variable in Asia's aging security landscape, not a constant–and helps to elucidate the many ways that demographic change is changing each state's approach to military security as well as where it is not.

Global rates of population growth and decline (2021–2022);

“The three traditional U.S. allies in Northeast Asia–Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan–face the most dramatic aging and shrinking populations in the Indo-Pacific in the 2020s. Yet, to date, none have moved in the direction of reducing their military capabilities or readiness due to their rapid aging. To the contrary, each has begun to implement strategies to adjust to actual and projected demographic change while strengthening military capabilities in response to rising perceptions of threats.

“Still, many challenges remain that are specific to the unique demographic and security challenges each faces–with two common threads being intensified aging and population shrinking and a growing concern about the military actions of Northeast Asia's aging autocracies, despite those states' own population shifts underway. Another common thread seen among these rapidly aging democracies is a growing engagement with security partners, especially a deepening of their security relationships with the United States.

“American allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region are all aging, but the Northeast Asian democracies face particularly challenging future demographics, as noted in earlier chapters–more intensified aging, especially low fertility rates, and little immigration, resulting in total population shrinkage. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan form the leading edge of rapid aging in Asia. They all have median ages of over 40, and all are projected to be super-aged in the 2020s (which Japan reached in 2005) and to climb to median ages over 50 years old in the 2030s.

“Northeast Asia's rapidly aging autocracies–security rivals to the United States and the Northeast Asian democracies–face a similar demographic future but on a later timetable, as illustrated in table 3-1. While Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all will have reached super-aged status by the 2020s, this milestone is projected to be reached by China and Russia in the mid-2020s, and North Korea only in 2040. China and North Korea also reached the earlier 'aged' status later than Northeast Asia's democracies.

“This later timing matters in the security arena for several reasons. First, the later agers can potentially learn from approaches taken and technologies developed to manage the aging transition by earlier-aging states. Second, to the extent that aging is a disadvantage in terms of military power–which is not a foregone conclusion in twenty-first-century conflict scenarios–the later-aging states would benefit from this delayed transition. Finally, related to the discussion of relevant scholarly literature in chapter 1, some argue that states may seek to lock in advantages of youth prior to predicted aging on the horizon, making the period of aging transition in the 2020s especially dangerous–the so-called power transition theory, which can lead to an aging security dilemma.

“In addition to the different year each state reaches its aging milestones, the speed at which it reaches each milestone varies among these Northeast Asian territories, also with important implications. South Korea, notably, has progressed from 'aging' to 'aged' status more quickly and is projected to similarly reach the super-aged and 30 percent milestones much more quickly as well. Looking further ahead, South Korea also is projected to overtake Japan as the region's most-aged state by 2050, when over 40 percent of its population is expected to be aged 65+. It is also worth underscoring that these next milestones for all the region's territories could happen even faster than projected and likely will, given further-declining birth rates and Russia's additional population losses as a result of its war with Ukraine (through both increased deaths and emigration).

“Beyond the rapid aging of societies in Northeast Asia, one could also view the Northeast Asian political regimes and their militaries as undergoing changes related to their advancing age. However, contrary to the societal movement toward super-aged status and the connotation of weakness and vulnerability that implies (rightly or wrongly), the military forces of all these states have entered a sort of 'middle age' that could be characterized as showing growing confidence and more mature capabilities. China, Taiwan, North Korea, and South Korea all effectively became new states and created new militaries in the late 194os/early 1950s, roughly seventy years ago. Moreover, each of these places apart from North Korea experienced significant internal changes in the late 1980s/1990s that led to considerable economic growth. As a result of both political and economic change, the militaries of these states embarked on significant modernization campaigns beginning in the 2000s that continue today. Japan's military also could be viewed as on a similar postwar trajectory, though initially for the different reason of its defeat in the Second World War. In Japan's case, its postwar military force, the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF), was created in 1954. Similar to China, Taiwan, and South Korea, the JSDF has embarked on a significant modernization campaign (though starting somewhat earlier, in the late 1980s) that has culminated more recently in new military roles and ambitions. The elevation of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) to the Ministry of Defense (MOD) in 2008 and the crafting of its first formal national security strategy document in 2013 are two milestones in Japan's military middle age.

“The relatively recent development of the contemporary political, economic, and military structures of these territories can be seen in generational attitudes related to military security discussed later in this chapter. More than age-period (the numerical age of those in different generations), the age-cohort effect is quite robust around generational groups within several of the territories examined in this chapter, which further dilutes scholarly predictions on the effect of aging on security outcomes, since those predictions generally, though not exclusively, are based on numerical age. For example, the generation that fought in wars to establish the current political regimes have identifiable traits versus the latest adult generation that grew up under greater economic prosperity. What are not apparent from the cases in this chapter are consistent attitudes about military security based on numerical age cross-nationally. As one example illustrated later in this chapter, those of the same numerical age-groups in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan illustrate different attitudes about security. Across these societies, there are numerous examples of older age-groups expressing a preference for greater military spending and engagement than younger age-groups, again contrary to what is predicted in existing scholarly literature.

“In everyday portrayals, aging is often perceived as leading to weakness, frailty, and vulnerability–as well as to wisdom, wealth, and experience. In the case of Northeast Asia's population-aging states, the developments in security policies after a decade of rapid aging lean toward the latter characteristics: All have increased their defense spending and military capabilities with no signs that this trend will lessen in the next decade of rapid aging and projected population shrinkage. (See table 3.2 for the specific spending increases.) They have achieved this change in part due to increased wealth and experience.

“At the same time as the aging democracies began to experience increased effects of rapid aging, their regional security environment significantly worsened–as introduced in chapter 2–leading to a much grayer set of security challenges in addition to an escalation of conventional military threats. For example, North Korea test-fired more than sixty missiles in 2022, the most ever in a single year, and forty in 2024. Many of the tests were of nuclear-capable missiles designed to strike the U.S. mainland and South Korea, with Japan also a viable target. As another concern, from 2010 to 2020 China increased its defense spending by 249.23 percent (89.34 percent in constant 2019 USD), far higher than any U.S. ally or partner in the region. Japan's December 2022 national security strategy warns that Japan faces 'the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII' and concludes with these ominous words: 'In no way can we be optimistic about what the future of the international community will bring.' South Korea's and Taiwan's national security documents express similar stark concerns, as discussed in later sections of this chapter.

“Given growing security challenges, it may not seem surprising that in the period 2010 to 2020, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea increased defense spending 14.37 percent, 23.16 percent, and a whopping 67 percent, respectively (calculated in local currency)–and that Japan soon after put into place a plan to increase its defense spending by around 65 percent over a five-year period from 2022 to 2027, with South Korea and Taiwan announcing plans to significantly increase their defense spending as well. Each also embarked on notable campaigns to increase military capabilities, including offensive capabilities. None of these reactions seems surprising through a realist balance-of-power lens, but they run contrary to predictions of numerous scholars and media analysts about the likely effect of rapid aging on military readiness. For example, as noted in chapter 1, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan–and China as well–all have reached demographic milestones that make them statistically far less likely to engage in war than other, 'younger" states.'

“Other factors beyond demographic change and the changing regional and global security environment additionally contribute to changes in security policies seen in Asia's aging states. The dramatic proliferation of grayzone conflicts is one factor. Change in military technologies is another, which has resulted in entirely new security domains for competition–such as cyber and outer space. New patterns in domestic politics, including the role of new political leaders, are yet another factor. But within the mix, the rapid aging of the region and intensifying population shrinkage are also affecting the specific trajectories of military preparedness. Shrinking populations and expanding tensions are an apparent paradox of Northeast Asia in the 2020s, leading to growing concerns that an aging security dilemma has emerged.”

author:	Andrew Oros
title:	Asia's Aging Security: How Demographic Change Affects America's Allies and Adversaries
publisher:	Columbia University Press
pages:	83-33