the start of the european union--8/20/24

20 Aug 2024

the start of the european union--8/20/24

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Today's selection -- from Europe Recast by Desmond Dinan. After World War II, politicians were eager to create a mutually interdependent European economy as a means of preventing yet another war. Since coal and steel were two of the main ingredients of war, uniting the coal and steel production of Germany and France seemed an ideal way to achieve this:

“The announcement of the Schuman Declaration took place at a hastily convened press conference late in the afternoon of May 9, 1950, in the French foreign ministry. Schuman proposed both a specific solution to the problem of the Ruhr (a supranational coal and steel organization) and a general solution to the German question (implicit equality and nondiscrimination in the context of European union). It was an approach that combined economic, political, and social objectives. The immediate goal was to ensure ‘the modernization of production and the improvement of its quality; the supply of coal and steel on equal terms to the French and German markets ... [and] to those of the [other] member countries; and the equalization as well as the improvement in the living standards and working conditions in those industries.’ Schuman linked this to the greater goal of European union, for which strong emotional support still existed despite the Council of Europe's disappointing development. Thus the coal and steel pool would ‘lay the first concrete foundation for a European Federation which is so indispensable to the preservation of peace.’

“The immediate background to the declaration was equally dramatic. [French politician Jean] Monnet, by his own account, developed the idea while on one of his periodic hiking holidays in the Alps, in April 1950. After returning to Paris, Monnet instructed key people in his planning office to work out the details. Having gone through various drafts, Monnet sent the final version first to Prime Minister Bidault, who did not respond, then to Foreign Minister [Robert] Schuman, who did. Monnet also contacted [German Chancellor Konrad] Adenauer through an intermediary. Aware of Adenauer's approval of it, Schuman slipped the proposal through a cabinet meeting on the morning on May 9, hours before the famous press conference.

“Monnet's account may be correct, but the manner of its telling, without adequate reference to the evolution of French foreign policy during the previous two years, gives the declaration a heroic quality to which early scholars of European integration eagerly subscribed. William Diebold, author of one of the first books on the Schuman Plan, wrote breathlessly about

‘a foreign minister who took a major ... initiative with little or no consultation with his own ministry; a rapid elaboration of the final version of the plan in great secrecy by a tiny group of people; only the briefest discussion before the Cabinet [of] ... a measure that went well beyond foreign policy and would have a major effect on the defense and economy of France; almost immediate public announcement with only the shortest notice to allies and others on whose assent success would depend.’

Jean Monnet, French Planning Commissioner, 1946-1952.

“Some historians of a later generation, notably Alan Milward, gleefully debunked the myth of May 9. Monnet was certainly imaginative and farsighted. But he did not conjure the proposed community out of nowhere. Ideas about a coal and steel association of some kind had been floating around France and Germany, in government and private circles, for several years; some could even be traced back to the interwar period. Thinking along such lines had intensified as France came under mounting pressure in 1949 and early 1950 to adopt a radically new approach toward Germany. Monnet was more astute than most: the idea of a High Authority as the supranational instrument of sectoral integration was novel and timely. Yet even Francois Duchene, Monnet's former collaborator and biographer, admits that the Schuman Declaration ‘may have been a lucky strike when other prospectors had given up.’

“Nor was it surprising that Monnet devoted so much thought to the idea. After all, it was Monnet who bore the brunt of US pressure for a new French policy toward Germany. Monnet was the main conduit for US-French relations in the late 1940s and early 1950s. He was in almost daily contact with the highest representatives of the United States in France. Monnet knew how badly Washington wanted Paris to launch a new initiative and how keenly Schuman wanted to oblige. Moreover, the future of the Monnet Plan was at stake. Economic modernization in France could not be realized without a resolution of the Ruhr problem. Whereas maintaining French control through the International Ruhr Authority was no longer feasible, the creation of a supranational community might succeed.

“Monnet was in his element when under pressure. He was an opportunist who thrived on crises (even his marriage involved elopement and intrigue). He was the right man (a fixer, a close friend of the Americans) in the right place (head of the national planning commission) at the right time (when France needed to come to terms with Germany's resurgence). With the Schuman Declaration, Monnet hit the jackpot. Not only did the Marshall Plan save the Monnet Plan but also, in Milward's memorable phrase, ‘the Schuman Plan was invented to safeguard the Monnet Plan.’”